pp1a04 cognoscere, cognitio NOT pp1d02 cogitare, cogitatio
Forms Cognoscere, cognitio, scire, scientia, conscientia, conscius, ignorare, ignorantia

Knowledge. Often treated substitutable with idea: "cognitio sive [mng eqv] idea". Indeed, what in Ethica is called cognitio can, just like an idea, be "false", in which case it is usually called inadequate rather than false, since Ethica also attacks the common notion of  falsehood (see veritas). Ideas and cognitio mean the same in Ethica, at least in so far both can very well be inadequate. This curiosity is not consistently inverted: cognitio inadaequata is indeed generally possible, but ignorantia is by meaning in Ethica always inadaequata.
--primi generis
: produced by imaginatio.
--secundi generis: produced on the basis of common notions
--tertii generis: from an adequate idea of the absolute essence of certain attributes of God = natura-sense 2 = substance to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things

Subsets (kinds) cognitio adaequata, cognitio primi, secundi and tertii generis (see below)
Mantras [what is] idea sive [mng-eqv] cognitio
adaequata, inadaequata
primo, secundo, tertio cognitionis genere (see below)
Related concepts negations ignorare, ignorantia linked to this page
Occurrence [geomap]
{2p33  Nihil positivum falsae}                                                   ... "knowledge" of the first kind can be falsitatis causa, so one might think that "belief" (not involving a truth connotation) would be a better word ... but it is not: because not even "knowledge of 1st kind",  contains falsity. Its falsity is outside, not inside it ...
... There is nothing positive in ideas, which causes them to be called false ... Nihil in ideis positivum est propter quod falsae dicuntur.
2p40s2 percipere 1 sensus mutilate 2 signis 3 notiones communes  ... there are three kinds of cognitio:  primi, secundi and tertii generis ...
... we ... perceive and form our general notions: ... nos multa percipere et notiones universales formare:
First kind: (1.) From particular things represented to our intellect fragmentarily, confusedly, and without order through our senses ... I have settled to call such perceptions by the name of knowledge from the mere suggestions of experience. (2.) From symbols, e.g., from the fact of having read or heard certain words we remember things and form certain ideas concerning them, similar to those through which we imagine things ... I shall call both these ways of regarding things knowledge of the first kind, opinion, or imagination.
Primi generis: I.  ex singularibus nobis per sensus mutilate, confuse et sine ordine ad intellectum repraesentatis ... et ideo tales perceptiones cognitionem ab experientia vaga vocare consuevi. II. Ex signis exempli gratia ex eo quod auditis aut lectis quibusdam verbis rerum recordemur et earum quasdam ideas formemus similes iis per quas res imaginamur ... Utrumque hunc res contemplandi modum cognitionem primi generis, opinionem vel imaginationem in posterum vocabo.
Second Kind: (3.) From the fact that we have notions common to all men, and adequate ideas of the properties of things ... this I call reason and knowledge of the second kind. Secundi generis: III. denique ex eo quod notiones communes rerumque proprietatum ideas adaequatas habemus ... atque hunc rationem et secundi generis cognitionem vocabo.
Third kind: Besides these two kinds of knowledge, there is, as I will hereafter show, a third kind of knowledge, which we will call intuition. This kind of knowledge proceeds from an adequate idea of the absolute essence of certain attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things.
Tertii generis: Praeter haec duo cognitionis genera datur, ut in sequentibus ostendam, aliud tertium quod scientiam intuitivam vocabimus. Atque hoc cognoscendi genus procedit ab adaequata idea essentiae formalis quorundam Dei attributorum ad adaequatam cognitionem essentiae rerum.
{2p41 primi generis falsitatis, secundi tertii vera}        ... the three kinds of knowledge enter the deductive structure (referring to 2p40s2) ...
... Knowledge of the first kind is the only source of falsity, knowledge of the second and third kinds is necessarily true. ... Cognitio primi generis unica est falsitatis causa, secundi autem et tertii est necessario vera.
... To knowledge of the first kind we have ... assigned all those ideas, which are inadequate and confused; therefore this kind of knowledge is the only source of falsity ... Furthermore, we assigned to the second and third kinds of knowledge those ideas which are adequate; therefore these kinds are necessarily true ... ... Ad primi generis cognitionem illas omnes ideas ... pertinere quae sunt inadaequatae et confusae atque adeo ... haec cognitio unica est falsitatis causa. Deinde ad cognitionem secundi et tertii illas pertinere diximus quae sunt adaequatae adeoque ... est necessario vera ...
{4p14 cognitio nullum affectum sed quatenus affectus}   ... knowledge is an emotion (affectus) ...
PROP. XIV. A true knowledge of good and evil cannot check any emotion by virtue of being true, but only in so far as it is considered as an emotion. PROPOSITIO XIV: Vera boni et mali cognitio quatenus vera nullum affectum coercere potest sed tantum quatenus ut affectus consideratur
{4p28 Summum mentis bonum Dei}    ... seu is  [a kind of] , since, there is another types of cognoscere, (imaginare) ...
... to understand or to know ... ... intelligere seu [a kind of] cognoscere ...
{4p64 Cognitio mali inadaequata}                                           ... evil cannot be adequately known ...
... The knowledge of evil is an inadequate knowledge ... Cognitio mali cognitio est inadaequata
Equivalence claims involving cognoscere, cognitio
{2p12} [About the knowledge of things] 1. will necessarily be in the mind 2. the mind perceives it [De rebus cognitioni] 1.erit necessario in mente 2. mens id percipit
and elsewhere
1. idea 2. knowledge 1. idea 2. cognitio
{2p19} [About God and the human mind] 1. God has the idea of the human body 2. [God] knows the human body, in so far as he is affected by very many other ideas, and not in so far as he constitutes the nature of the human mind [De deo et menti humane] 1. [Deus] ideam corporis humani habet 2. [Deus] corpus humanum cognoscit quatenus plurimis aliis ideis affectus est et non quatenus naturam humanae mentis constituit
{2p25} 1. an adequate knowledge of the external body is not in God, in so far as he has the idea of the modification [Lat: affectiones] of the human body 2. the idea of the modification [Lat: affectiones] of the human body does not involve an adequate knowledge of the external body. 1. corporis externi adaequata cognitio in Deo non est quatenus ideam affectionis humani corporis habet 2. idea affectionis corporis humani adaequatam corporis externi cognitionem non involvit.
{2p29} [About the ideas of affections of the human body] 1. do not involve an adequate knowledge of the said body 2. do not adequately express its nature 3. do not adequately agree with the nature of the mind 4. the ideas of such ideas do not adequately express the nature of the human mind 5. [the ideas of such ideas] do not involve an adequate knowledge thereof. [De ideis affectionis corporis humani] 1. adaequatam ipsius corporis cognitionem non involvit 2. ejus naturam adaequate non exprimit 3. cum natura mentis non convenit adaequate 4. hujus ideae ideam adaequate humanae mentis naturam non exprimit 5. [hujus ideae ideam] adaequatam ejus cognitionem non involvit.
{5p25} 1. [the mind's highest] virtue 2 ...power... 3 ...nature... 4. ...endeavour... 5. understand things by the third kind of knowledge.  1. summa mentis virtus 2. [summa] mentis potentia. 3. [summa mentis] natura 4. summus conatus 5. res intelligere tertio cognitionis genere
{5p27} [It is the mind's highest virtue] 1. to know God 2. to understand things by the third kind of knowledge  [Summa mentis virtus est] 1. Deum cognoscere 2. res tertio cognitionis genere intelligere 
{5p28} [About ideas]  1. adequate 2. by the second and third kinds of knowledge [De ideis] 1. adaequatis 2. ex secundo et tertio cognitionis